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THE UNAVAILABILITY TO
CORPORATIONS OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:

A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION
Based on EPA v. Caltex, High Court of Australia*
Norman M. Garland**
I. INTRODUCTION

The High Court of Australia's decision' denying the availability of the
178 C.L.R. 477 (1993) (Austl.).
The questions on appeal before the High Court of Australia arose out of a
prosecution by the appellant, the Environmental Protection Authority, of the respondent,
Caltex Refining Co. Pty. Ltd., for eleven pollution offenses of discharging grease and oil
into the ocean and several licensing breaches under the Clean Waters Act 1970 and the
State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970. "Following the commencement of the
prosecution, the EPA served on Caltex two notices, each requiring Caltex to produce
identical documents relating to the pollution offenses. The first notice was a notice
pursuant to § 29(2)(a) of the Clean Waters Act 1970 ... and the second was a notice to
produce pursuant to the Rules of the Land and Environment Court. ... " Id. at 486. The
EPA's sole purpose for executing these notices was to obtain evidence and information to
use in the prosecution against Caltex. In response, Caftex challenged the issuance of the
notices. The trial court held that Caltex was required to produce the documents requested
in the notices, but submitted certain questions of law to the Court of Criminal Appeal for
determination. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that Caltex as an incorporated
company is entitled to a privilege against self-incrimination and that Caltex did not have
to produce documents in response to the notices. The High Court reversed that decision
of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
** Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles. The
author is indebted to Vincent Del Buono, for his prodding; Professor David E. Aaronson
of Washington College of Law, American University, for his penetrating criticism and
suggestions; Ms. Romy Schneider, Southwestern University School of Law, Class of
1996, for her research assistance and other input; Diana Spielberger, for her editorial
suggestions; and his wife, Melissa Grossan, for her editorial suggestions.
1. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. 477. The Justices of the High Court of Australia delivered four
separate judgments in Caltex. The judgment authored by Chief Justice Mason and Justice
*
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privilege against self-incrimination to corporations (and other "collective
entities") 2 follows the lead of American judicial pronouncements 3 by
declaring the privilege to be limited to humans, but denies the human
agents of collective entities the benefit of the privilege. In so doing, the
Australian Court breaks with the United States Supreme Court in that the
Australians recognize that a human may invoke the privilege to refuse to
imnninate the agent
produce incrumnating documents that may
personally, 4 but the Australians agree with the Americans that neither a
corporation (through its agent) nor the agent of a corporation may refuse
to produce incriminating documents. 5 In upholding the right of a human
to assert the privilege against compelled production of documents, the
Australian majority gives deference to the principle that the onus of proof
is upon the prosecution and stays there until satisfied,6 a doctrine best
expressed by the term "presumption of innocence."
However, the

Toohey, speaking to the position of the majority, is the judgment most often referred to
herein and to which I shall refer as the majority opinion.
2. Under the collective entity rubric, or doctrine, any non-human entity is denied the
privilege against self-incrimination. As the majority put it in Caltex, the privilege is not
available "to artificial legal entities such as corporations." 178 C.L.R. at 507-08; see
also, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-09 (1988).
3. The United States Supreme Court has comprehensively denied the privilege against
self-incrimination to all artificial entities. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the
Court held that the right under the Fifth Amendment not to incriminate one's self was
strictly a personal privilege and that an individual could not claim the privilege on behalf

oaf a third petsian eveni thaugh the inxdividual was the third pe rsoru' a~genxt. fd. at 69. The
Hale Court also introduced the concept that a corporation is a "creature of the State" and
"its powers are limited by law." Id. at 74. In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974), the Court pointed out that an agent cannot rely on his personal privilege to avoid
the production of the entity's documents which are in the agent's possession in a
representative capacity. Id. at 97-98. The privilege is denied even though the documents
might incriminate the agent personally. Id. Most recently, in Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988), the Court upheld the collective entity rule by precluding a corporation
from claiming the privilege. Id. at 104-09. Documents in an agent's possession in a
representative capacity give rise to a duty to produce records on proper demand by the
government. The agent's act of production is not considered a personal act, but rather,
the act of the corporation. Id.at 109-10.
4. The majority seems to assume arguendo that the privilege protects "the individual
from being compelled to produce incriminating books and documents ... " Caltex, 178
C.L.R. at 503.
5. Id.at 504.
6. See id.at 501.
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Australians refuse to extend the presumption of innocence to collective
entities or their agents. 7
It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that because
1. the "scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in its
application to corporations is, because of the very nature of
a corporation, somewhat limited";'
2. in some instances a collective entity's, or its agent's,
response to a demand for information (the act of production)
serves to incriminate the entity or the agent; and
3. the preservation of the presumption of innocence is a right
of greater value than the slight gain in effective law
enforcement,
the choice by the Australian High Court, as well as the previous choice by
the American Supreme Court, is misguided.
The Australian majority bases its decision on a close examination of
the "purpose of the privilege . . . with a view to ascertaining whether it
is available to corporations. . .. " In so doing, the Court rejects the
common law rules of England,10 Canada, " and New ZealandY which
recognize a corporate privilege against self-incrimination, adopting instead
the trend of the legislative pronouncements of British Parliament, 3 the
effect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 14 the broad
7. Id. at 508.
8. Id.at 535.
9. Id.at 497.
10. Id. at 493 (citing Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v. Westinghouse Electric Corp, 1978 App.
Cas. 547 (appeal taken from Eng.); Triplex Safety Glass Co., Ltd. v. Lancegaye Safety
Glass (1934) Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395).
11. Id. at 494-96 (citing Webster v. Soloway Mills & Co., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 831 (Alta.
Sup. Ct.); R. v. Amway Corp., 56 D.L.R.4th 309 (1989) (Can.)).
12. Id. at 496 (citing New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Bd. v. Master & Sons
Ltd., [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 191).
13.
Parliament has recognised the unsatisfactory results of the common
law privilege against self-incrimination and has been willing to
The rule has been abrogated
abrogate or modify that privilege ....
with regard to theft when the plaintiff is deprived of money....
The rule has been abrogated in favour of the intellectual property
monopolist seeking damages for fraudulent interference with his
statutory rights.... Under the Act of 1987 the privilege against
self-incrimination does not apply to investigation of serious or
complex fraud.
A.T. & T. Istel Ltd. v. Tully, 1993 App. Cas. 45, 55 (appeal taken from Eng.).
14. Justice Sopinka points out in R. v. Amway Corp., 56 D.L.R.4th, 309 (1989), that
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comments of the British judiciary,"5 and, of course, the position of the
United States Supreme Court,1 6 all of which have denied or limited the
application of the privilege to corporations.
At the root of the justification for the denial of the privilege against
self-incrimination to corporate and other collective entities and their agents
are two companion assumptions: (1) a corporation, being non-human,
necessarily cannot act other than through a human agency; and (2) when
a corporate agent engages in such a necessary act on behalf of a
corporation, such an act is the corporation's act, not the individual agent's.
Thus, a corporation cannot assert the privilege because it is not a human
being compelled to be a witness, and the agent, who is not the
corporation, is not the accused.
The High Court of Australia majority accepts this popular position
and supports it with a policy pronouncement that the privilege against selfincrimination is truly based only on the desire to prevent torture and other
inhumane treatment of human beings.' 7 Since corporations are not human
beings, there is no need for the privilege to apply to them. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court permits the compulsion of corporate agents, as
individuals, to give evidence against their alter-egos, if not themselves,
and although the Court assumes arguendo that the presumption of
innocence may be invoked by humans to prevent compelled document
production,"8 the Court in fact rejects the ideal of the presumption of
although there might be a common law privilege against self-incrimination afforded to a
corporation, the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 11(c) limits the
availability of the privilege to a witness and, since a corporation cannot be a witness, it
has no privilege. Id. at 322. See also Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 495-96.
15. In British Steel v. Granada Television, 1981 App. Cas. 1096 (appeal taken from
Eng.), Lord Denning "boldly asserted that 'in these courts, as in the United States, the
privilege is not available to a corporation."' Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 494 (citing British
Steel, 1981 App. Cas. at 1127).
16. See supra note 3.
17. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499-500.
18. Id. Both English and Canadian courts have held that the production of documents
and testimony of corporate agents against their employer could not be used against the
agent in subsequent criminal prosecutions as mandated by statutory provisions. R. v.
Judge of the General Sessions of the Peace for the County of York, ex parte Corning
Glass Works of Canada Ltd., (1970), 16 D.L.R.3d 609, 613 (Ont. Ct. App. 1970); A.T.
& T. Istel Ltd. v. Tully, 1993 App. Cas. 45, 55 (appeal taken from Eng.). However, the
United States courts have not recognized statutory immunity for corporate agents regarding
the production of documents against their accused employer. In the subsequent criminal
prosecution of the agent, the prosecution may not introduce evidence linking the accused
agent to the previous subpoena or production of documents, but the evidence of the
subpoena and production by the company may be used for purposes of authentication of
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innocence's burden of proof requirement in application to corporations.19
Of course, the ultimate policy justification for this narrow definition of the
privilege against self-incrimination and presumption of innocence is that
to grant such rights to collective entities and their agents "would have a
detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar
crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement
authorities. "20
The Court's reasoning in denying the availability of the privilege
against self-incrimination has a compelling logical appeal: a collective
entity, being non-human, cannot be a witness. Therefore a corporation (or
other collective entity) cannot assert a privilege against compelled
testimony. An agent of a collective entity, when acting as such, is the
entity and therefore cannot assert a privilege either for the same reasons.
And, if seeking to assert the privilege as a human on behalf of the
corporation, the agent is in the position of seeking to assert someone else's
privilege, which is not possible. Moreover, the reach of any rule limiting
compelled production of testimony requires that some testimony be
involved-thus, to the extent that the production of pre-existing documents
is in question, requiring production does not involve testimony whether
production is sought from a human or a collective entity.21 Even assuming
for the sake of argument that a human can refuse to produce pre-existing
documents, this is not a necessary element of the privilege and thus is not
an "essential element in the accusatorial system. "22 Thus, making the
privilege unavailable to corporations to refuse production of compelled
incriminating documents would not compromise the accusatorial system.
There are two problems with this reasoning:
the same documents sought to be introduced at trial. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S.
99, 118 (1988).
19. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499.

20. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J). What Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist
states in the text is in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States and applied to a closely held corporation and its
custodian of records. However, this statement represents the animating viewpoint of those
courts elsewhere that have similarly voted against the availability of the privilege to
corporations. The High Court of Australia noted that the effect of the privilege "is to
shield corporate criminal activity." Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 504 (opinion of Justices Mason
& Toohey). Those same Justices went on to say that the "availability of the privilege to
corporations has a disproportionate and adverse impact in restricting the documentary
evidence which may be produced to the court in a prosecution of a corporation for a
criminal offense." Id.
21. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-12 (1976).
22. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 503.
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1.

It implies that the American Supreme Court is correct in denying
even a human the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent
compelled disclosure of a pre-existing document, while assuming
arguendo this is not the rule in Australia; and
2. It pays only lip service to what I call the principle of presumption
of innocence because, by so implying that there is no privilege
to refuse compelled production by a human, the Court thereby
justifies not extending the privilege to collective entities.
Thus, like the United States Supreme Court,' and by a bare majority
of the Justices on both Courts,24 in the name of law enforcement, and
without balancing the incremental gain from promoting such law
enforcement interests against the cost of erosion of individual rights, the
High Court of Australia proclaims that "if it ever was the common law in
Australia that corporations could claim the privilege against selfincrimination in relation to the production of documents, it is no longer the
common law. "I It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in the
analysis of balancing the interests of the state against those of the
individual; however, it is the purpose of this paper to question the Court
making such a choice without such analysis.
I. GENERAL THEORIES OF PRIVILEGE AND RELATION TO
THE ISSUE OF AVAILABILITY TO CORPORATIONS
The opinion of Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey of the High
Court of Australia surveys the history and development of the privilege,
relying in large part upon the analysis contained in Professor
McNaughton's revision of Wigmore's original analysis and identifying the
modern rationale for the privilege as "protection of the individual from
being confronted by the 'cruel trilemma' of punishment for refusal to
testify, punishment for truthful testimony or perjury (and the consequential
possibility of punishment). "26 This rationale, the Court noted, is
predicated upon a more refined philosophy: "[T]he privilege is now seen

23. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119.
24. Remember, Caltex was 4-3 and Braswell was 5-4. However, the United States
Supreme Court decision that eliminated the private papers privilege against selfincrimination, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), was a 6-2 decision, with only
Justices Breman and Marshal objecting to the detse of the "private papers" doctrine and
yet concurring in the result reached in the case.
25. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 508.
26. Id. at 498.
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to be one of many internationally recognized human rights. "2 7 Clearly this
rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination forecloses the
availability of the privilege to a non-human entity, including a corporation.
This conclusion had already been reached by the courts of the United
States and Canada and had been acknowledged by the courts in England"
as the Caltex Court notes in its own opinion.2 9
There are numerous justifications, or reasons, for the privilege both
historically and theoretically. Wigmore (through McNaughton)m identifies
twelve, as the Caltex Court observes. Moreover, as that same Court also
notes, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,31
referring to the Wigmorean justifications, eloquently articulated a list of
his own:
It [the privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations:
1. our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
2. our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice;
3. our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses;
4. our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load," [citing Wigmore];
5. our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and
of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he
may lead a priate fife," [I&hrg Grunewaldl;
6. our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;

27. Id.
28. Although the English decisions, most notably A. T. & T. Istel Ltd. v. Tully, make
it clear that the demise of the privilege in any setting, including its application to
corporations, is for Parliament, not the courts, to declare. Istel, 1993 App. Cas. at 57
(judgment of Griffiths, J.).
29. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 489-500.
30. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 310-17 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
31. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a
shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
[citing Quinn].32

Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey, in Caltex, after reviewing
this legal literature, conclude that, of the twelve reasons put forth in
Wigmore on Evidence:
"[t]he
privilege prevents torture and other inhumane treatment of a
[W]e need only refer to the last two, namely:

human being

. .

...

. [; and it] contributes to a fair state-individual

balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
government 33
entire load."
Moreover, the Court asserts that the first of these reasons, the prevention
corresponds to
of inhumane treatment of human beings "in essence.,
the only present-day justification for the privilege according to Lord
Templeman" 34 in A.T. & T. Istel Ltd v. Tully,35 the most recent British
decision of the House of Lords on the subject of the rationale for the
privilege. According to the Caltex majority, that valid justification is the
"discouragement of ill-treatment of suspects and the extraction of dubious
confessions. "36
Of course, by focusing on the human scope of the origin and history
of the privilege,37 the Caltex majority is impelled to conclude that the
32. Id. at 55 (referencing 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE, 317 (McNaughton rev., 1961);
United States v. Grutnewatd, 233 F,2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. t956) (Frank, L, dissenting),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)) (altered
to outline style).
33. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2251, at 310-17
(McNaughton rev. 1961)).
34. Id.
35. 1993 App. Cas. 45 (appeal taken from Eng.). The Istel case did not specifically
involve the privilege in the corporate setting. However, it is very significant that the
Lords' judgments, particularly Lord Templeman's, do not deny the view that the privilege
against self-incrimination is generally available to bodies and persons, which, by these
terms, include corporations. Id. at 51-70.
36. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499 (referencing Istel, 1993 App. Cas. 45). As Lord
Templeman put it- "Parliament has recognized in a piecemeal fashion hal tlhe privilege
against self-incrimination is profoundly unsatisfactory when no question of ill-treatment
or dubious confessions is involved." Istel, 1993 App. Cas. at 53.
37. "Neither the fact that the privilege had its origin in the necessity of protecting
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"historical reasons for the creation and recognition of the privilege do not
support its extension to corporations." 38 "Likewise" the majority
concludes that "the modern and international treatment of the privilege as
a human right which protects personal freedom, privacy and human
argument for holding that corporations
dignity is a less than convincing
39
should enjoy the privilege. "
Next, the Caltex majority turns to the judgment of the lower court,
the Court of Criminal Appeal, 4" written by sitting Chief Justice Gleeson
of the New South Wales Supreme Court, where, in granting the
availability of the privilege to corporations, Chief Justice Gleeson stated
the "principal bases" are that the privilege "assists in maintaining the fair
state-individual balance and that it 'is a significant element in maintaining
the integrity of our accusatorial system of criminal justice,' which requires
the Crown to prove its case before the accused is called upon to
answer." 4 Only if the High Court were to accept one or the other of
these justifications for the privilege in the corporate setting could the
privilege be made available to a corporation. And, of course, the Court
rejects these grounds of analysis.
As for the fair state-individual balance rationale, the majority says
they "reject without hesitation the suggestion that the availability of the
privilege to corporations achieves or would achieve a correct balance
between state and corporation."42 Based upon the recognition that
corporations are in a stronger position than an individual in relation to the
state 43 and that their status as entities has made corporate and complex
fraud crime difficult for the state to regulate, the majority concludes that

human beings from compulsion to testify on pain of excommunication or physical
punishment nor the modern justification of discouraging ill-treatment of individuals and
dubious confessions requires that the privilege be available to corporations. Although
corporations are susceptible to punishment, whether by means of imposition of fines or
sequestration, they cannot suffer physical punishment. Nor can they testify or be required
to testify except through their officers." Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499-500.
38. Id. at 500.
39. Id.
40. Caltex Refining Co. Pty. Ltd. v. State Pollution Control Comm'n, 25 N.S.W. L.R.
118 (1991).
41. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 500 (citations omitted).
42. Id.

43. Id. However, small corporations consisting of two or more shareholders would
not have any more advantage against the state than would an individual charged with a
crime. See Ross Ramsay, Corporationsand the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 15
U.N.S.W. L.J. 297, 309 (1992).
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"in maintaining a 'fair' or 'correct' balance between state and corporation,
the operation of the privilege should be confined to natural persons.,"44
The majority then goes on to analyze the next prong of Chief Justice
Gleeson's justification for applying the privilege to corporations, the
maintenance of the accusatorial system of justice. The accusatorial system
is predicated on the principle that the onus is on the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused, and that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.45 If the onus is on the prosecution, then that principle must be
"complemented by the elementary principle that no accused person can be
compelled by process of law to admit the offence with which he or she is
charged[.] "46 The majority then asserts that "[tihat principle, which was
primarily directed against a requirement to testify or admit guilt, was
extended, by means of the privilege against self-incrimination, so as to
protect an accused from compliance with an obligation arising by process
of law to produce incriminating documents. " 47 Presumably, the italicized
principle in the last quoted sentence is the principle requiring the
prosecution to bear the onus of proof. The Caltex majority thus links the
privilege against self-incrimination as applied to the production of
documents to the burden or onus of proof requirement in criminal cases.
Moreover, the majority then assumes, at least arguendo, that the
privilege is available to a natural person to refuse the production of
documents.48 The Caltex majority points out that under English law,
"settled as early as the eighteenth century, the courts would not make an
order requiring an accused person to produce documents which would or
might tend to incriminate him or her of the offence charged. "49 Thus, the
privilege "protects an accused person who is required by process of law
to produce documents which tend to implicate that person in the
commission of an offence charged."' Moreover, "[i]n its application to
the production of documents, the operation of the privilege is more far
reaching in the protection which it gives than in its application to oral
evidence"" -that is "because the privilege protects a person from

44. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 500-01.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Woolmington v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1935 All E.R. 1, 7-8 (H.L.).
Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 500-01.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 502.
Id.
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of
discovering or revealing information which may lead to the discovery
52
admissible evidence of guilt not in his or her possession or power."
Of course, this assumption that the privilege may be exercised by a
natural person to avoid producing documents that contain incriminating
matter has been declared unjustified by the United States Supreme Court,
so long as the production order does not compel any "testimony." 53 In
Fisherv. United States,54 Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, states
that "the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has
long been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions
of the Fifth Amendment against compelling a person to give 'testimony'
that incriminates him,"" and thus laid to rest the rule that "private papers"
are not producible at the government's demand because they are shielded
by the privilege against self-incrimination.
Fisher had as much of an impact on the privilege against selfincrimination in the human setting as in the collective entity setting. In
Fisher, the IRS served summonses upon taxpayers' attorneys. The
taxpayers had transmitted tax records prepared by their accountants to the
taxpayers' attorneys. The attorneys asserted, among other things, that
they could not be compelled to produce the documents because to do so
would violate their clients' privilege against self-incrimination.56 Holding
that the privilege did not apply, the Court jettisoned the "private papers"
principle and asserted that the "proposition that the Fifth Amendment
prevents compelled production of documents over objection that such
production might incriminate stems from Boyd v. United States. .
After reviewing the facts of Boyd,58 the Fisher Court went on to point out

52. Id.
53. Oue should, perhaps, distinguish between compelling production of documents (or

other materials) by subpoena on the one hand, and by warrant, on the other. This paper
only addresses the issues relating to the privilege against self-incrimination raised by the
state's attempt to obtain incriminating materials by subpoena. Although the issues relating
to securing such material by way of warrant, presumably based upon probable cause, are
somewhat connected to this topic and are of interest, those issues are beyond the scope of
this paper.
54. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
55. Id. at 409.
56. Id. at 393-95.
57. Id. at 405 (referencing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
58. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd was a civil forfeiture proceeding in which the
government had subpoenaed the partners of an importing business to produce incriminating
invoices. The Supreme Court held that the invoices were inadmissible. The Court ruled
that the subpoena violated the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirements with
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that "[a]mong its several pronouncements, Boyd was understood to declare
that the seizure, under warrant or otherwise, of any purely evidentiary
materials violated the Fourth Amendment and that the Fifth Amendment
rendered these seized materials inadmissible." 59 Moreover, "[sleveral of
Boyd's express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.
The application of the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas was limited by
[inter alia] Hale v. Henkel, "' the "mere evidence" rule was rejected when
Warden v. Hayden6 held that "[plurely evidentiary (but 'nontestimonial')
materials, as well as contraband and fruits and instrumentalities of
crime" 62 may be the subject of search and seizure, and "any notion that
'testimonial' evidence may never be seized and used in evidence" 63 died
with the decision in Katz v. United States,' which held that conversations
65

are subject to seizure.
The Fisher Court found that the taxpayers had no privilege to protect
against producing documents prepared by their tax accountants in the
taxpayers' or their attorneys' possession, since the documents contained
no compelled testimony. 66 The Court did concede that the act of
producing such documents might be incriminating under certain

respect to search and seizure and that "the accused in a criminal case or the defendant in
a forfeiture action could not be forced to produce evidentiary items without violating the
Fifth Amendment as well as the Fourth." Fisher,425 U.S. at 405-06 (summarizing the
holding of Boyd).
59. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407.
60. Id. (referencing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)). Hale v. Henkel is, of
course, most renowned for its declaration that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not available when immunity is granted, when asserted on behalf of another, or on behalf
of a corporation. Hale, 201 U.S. at 69. See generally Fisher, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
61. 389 U.S. 294 (1967).
62. Fisher,425 U.S. at 407 (citing Warden).
63. Id.
64. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (cited in Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407-08).
65. 389 U.S. at 357-59.
66.
A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an
accountant's workpapers in his possession without doubt involves
substantial compulsion. But it does not compel oral testimony; nor
would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm
the truth of the contents of the documents sought. Therefore, the
Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the
papers on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the
privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his
own compelled testimonial communications.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (1976).
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circumstances: " [c ] ompliance with the subpoena tacitly" admits the papers'
existence, their "possession or control by the taxpayer," and the
"taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena." 67
In the cases before the Court in Fisher itself,61 the Court concluded that
there were no compelled incriminating aspects in the "act of producing"
by either taxpayer and that in any event such questions regarding the
incriminating nature of the act of production "do not lend themselves to
categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof." 69 Some years later,
in Braswell v. United States,70 the Court effectively foreclosed the use of
the act of production as a basis for the shield of the privilege against selfincrimination in the corporate setting, as will be discussed further
hereinafter. 7 '
Nonetheless, the Caltex majority assumes that the privilege against
self-incrimination does shield a person from the requirement of producing
documents or other evidence which would be incriminating or lead to
incriminating evidence. 72 However, the majority concludes that because
this manifestation of the privilege "extends well beyond the objects
originally sought to be achieved by way of protecting natural persons from
the abuses which necessitated the introduction of the privilege, 71 and even
though the production of documents may have some testimonial aspects,
"the case for protecting a person from compulsion to make an admission
of guilt is much stronger than the case for protecting a person from
compulsion to produce books or documents which are in the nature of real
evidence of guilt and are not testimonial in character. "74
Even accepting arguendo that "the privilege does protect the
individual from being compelled to produce incriminating books and
documents," the Caltex majority continues, "it does not follow that the
protection is an essential element in the accusatorial system of justice or
that its unavailability in this respect, at least in relation to corporations,

67.
68.
to the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 410.
Fisherwas heard together with No. 74-611, United States v. Kasmir, on certiorari
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Id.
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 503.
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would compromise that system."75 The Justices then proclaim that: "[T]he
fundamental principle that the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
rests on the Crown would remain unimpaired, as would the companion
rule that an accused person cannot be required to testify to the commission
of the offence charged." 7 6 Thus, the Justices opine that all considerations
support the "conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination in its
entirety is not available to corporations. "77
Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey then conclude their analysis
of the privilege's unavailability to corporations and their agents by
invoking the policy of law enforcement necessity and efficiency previously
discussed. Thus, we are back to the beginning: the rationale of the
decision is the law and order view that to allow the privilege to
corporations would inhibit law enforcement78 and the incursion into
individual rights is not worth exploring because the right (privilege) really
does not exist at all; it has only been assumed arguendo to exist. Without
weighing the cost to society of the relinquishment of the right not to be
compelled to aid the prosecution, it is inappropriate to assume that
society's interest in effective law enforcement is worth more.
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: THE MISSING LINK
OF THE CALTEX ANALYSIS

The Caltex majority articulates two policy principles that justify the
imposition of a rule of no privilege for corporations. First, there is the

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 504. The Caltex majority gave an indication of how the privilege has slipped
in importance by noting the following two points:
First, the Justices pointed out that the "right to silence" confuses the issue, since "a
number of separate and distinct immunities are generally clustered together under the label
the 'right to silence,' thereby leading to the misconception that 'they are all different ways
of expressing the same principle, whereas in fact they are not."' Id. at 503. (quoting
Lord Mustill's speech in Regina v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex parte Smith,
1993 App. Cas. 1, at 30-34 (appeal taken from Eng.)).
Secondly, the Caltex majority noted that even though the self-incrimination privilege
"has been described as 'deep rooted in English Law,"' there have been numerous
legislative abrogations of the privilege "in many of its aspects, including its application
to the product'on of documentts." Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 503 (citation omitted). For
example, there have been statutes "regulating examinations and inquiries into the affairs
of corporations, whether undertaken by liquidators, inspectors or other investigators.
Id.at 503-04.
78. See supra notes 3, 20, and accompanying text.
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policy that a corporation is a creature of the state and is subject to greater,
if not complete, scrutiny by the state as part of the price of its
existence-i.e., the visitatorial power of the state.7 9 Second, there is a

desire to expand investigatory and prosecutorial powers-i.e., law
enforcement weapons-in the name of law and order to quell the present
grave criminal threat to society at large. 8°
The first policy-the visitatorial power principle-has been
"jettisoned" 8 as a justification for the collective entity rule,82 and offers
no acceptable explanation for the result of denying the privilege of selfincrimination in the corporate setting. The second policy-effective law
enforcement-is presented only as result. The Justices present no analysis
in support of the choice of rejecting the individual right in favor of
assumed greater good to society. In an analogous setting, the American
exclusionary rule has been held by the United States Supreme Court to
have exceptions which have been carved out on a cost-benefit analysis.8 3
This analogy goes only so far, however, since a basic premise for the
exclusionary rule exceptions is that the rule is not constitutionally based.'

79. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 499-503.
80. Id. at 500-01.
81. The American courts have disclaimed the power of visitation as a justification for
denial of a corporate privilege. See C.J. Rehnquist's opinion in Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988), citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944): "In
applying the collective entity rule to unincorporated associations such as unions, the Court
jettisoned reliance on the visitatorial powers of the State over corporations owing their
existence to the State-one of the bases for earlier decisions." Braswell, 487 U.S. at 108.
There is also a flavor of that reasoning in the language of the opinion of Chief Justice
Mason and Justice Toohey in Caltex. See Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 491.
82. Beginning with the case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906), where the
Court declared the privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to corporations, the
Court has consistently held the privilege inapplicable to any collective entity on the same
rationale (i.e., that the privilege is strictly personal.). See, e.g., Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnerships); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (labor
unions). The "collective entity" rule or doctrine is specifically referred to as such in
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104, where the Court distinguished between the applicability of the
privilege to sole proprietorships and its inapplicability to collective entities. With respect
to sole proprietorships, the Court specifically relied upon United States v. Doe, 465 U.S.
605 (1984), where the Court recognized the validity of a claim of privilege against selfincrimination in the act of production of incriminating documents by a sole proprietor even
where the documents themselves were not protected.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
84. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy's dissent in Braswell, where he notes that there cannot
be a balancing of interests arising out of the Fifth Amendment based on some "vague
sense of fairness." 487 U.S. at 128.
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In the context of analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination,
certainly as a common law principle, the analogy is valid: Even though not
constitutionally mandated, the privilege should only yield if there is a
countervailing gain to society.
Based only on these policy principles favoring the denial of the
privilege to corporations, the Caltex majority concludes the State's
coercion of the production of incriminating corporate documents (1) does
not violate an essential element of the accusatorial system or compromise
that system; (2) leaves unimpaired "the fundamental principle that the onus
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" rests on the prosecution; and (3)
leaves unimpaired "the companion rule that an accused person85cannot be
required to testify to the commission of the offence charged.
Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey do not further explain why
we should accept these conclusions. Thus, one is impelled to ask
1. Why is it that the State's coercion of the production of
incriminating corporate documents does not violate an essential
element of the accusatorial system or compromise that system?
2. Why does the State's coercion of the production of incriminating
corporate documents leave unimpaired the fundamental principle
that the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the
prosecution?
3. Why does allowing the coerced production of documents leave
unimpaired the companion rule that an accused person cannot be
required to testify to the commission of the offense charged?
In the opinion of Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey leading up
to the assertion of these three conclusions, the Justices discussed at least
three principles which might provide answers to these questions. These
three principles are: a corporation is not human and therefore cannot be
subject to inhumane treatment; 6 being nonhuman, a corporation cannot be
a witness and therefore it cannot be compelled to testify, against itself or
anyone; 7 and compelled production of a document which contains
incriminating material is not compelled testimony and thus does not violate
the principles underlying the privilege. 8
Some other principles which might provide answers to those questions
that are not stated by the Caltex majority but might be implied are: any
relevant statement against interest made by a suspect is usable by the

85. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 503.
86. Id. at 498-99.

87. Id. at 499-500.
88. Id. at 502-03.
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prosecution; such use is not prohibited by the privilege against selfincrimination; the State's coercion of document production is not violative
of the privilege against self-incrimination; and only the coercion of
testimony is prohibited.
Some combination of these reasons, articulated or implied by the
Justices, provide good technical answers to the questions posed, or at least
mechanical answers. Surely, the privilege against self-incrimination,
having been born of the excesses of the Star Chamber and Ecclesiastical
Courts, was intended to prevent the excesses of inhumanity and extraction
of dubious confessions. Since a corporation cannot assert its own
privileges, much less testify and be coerced, it could never suffer the
harms against which the privilege was aimed.8 9 A corporate agent, not
being the corporation itself, cannot assert the privilege of that other
entity. 90
However, none of these justifications addresses the spirit behind, nor
concept underlying, the fundamental choice that the privilege against selfincrimination represents. That choice is between the inquisitorial system
on the one hand, and the accusatorial system on the other. 9' When the
Justices in Caltex refer to the "accusatorial system," presumably they are
using it synonymously with the "adversary system." Either phrase carries
with it the notions associated with individual rights vis-A-vis the state, set
forth in the United States Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, or summarized in the range of justifications articulated in
The
support of the privilege by Wigmore and Justice Goldberg.'
the
of
aspect
privilege against self-incrimination is a very significant
differences that inhere in the adversary system. However, the privilege
is not all there is. The placing of the onus on the prosecution to bear the
burden of production and persuasion in a criminal case is a significant
block in the foundation of the accusatorial system. Moreover, the
companion principle accompanying the onus and the privilege is the
presumption of innocence.
89. This same argument was addressed by the British Court of Appeal in Triplex Safety
Glass Co., Ltd. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass, [1939] 2 All E.R. 613 (C.A), which upheld

refusals by both a corporation and a corporate agent to answer interrogatories that would
tend to incriminate themselves. Lord Justice Du Parcq agreed that a company cannot
"suffer all the pains to which a real person is subject," but he also recognized that a
corporate defendant can still be "convicted and punished, with grave consequences to its
reputation and to its members." Id. at 621.
90. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).

91. See WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 315.
92. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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The prosecution must not only bear the onus of production of
evidence and persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt, but it must do so
without any assistance from the accused. The relationship of the privilege
against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence in this formula
is fundamental and must be seen to operate hand-in-hand with the privilege
against-self-incrimination, but also independently of it.
Wigmore explains that the presumption of innocence is "merely
another form of expression for a part of the accepted rule for the burden
of proof in criminal cases, i.e., the rule that it is for the prosecution to
adduce evidence, and to produce persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt."9 3
The presumption "implies" that the accused may remain silent "until the
prosecution has taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected
persuasion. "' The "right to silence" which stems from the presumption
of innocence has thus created, in a criminal matter, a burden upon the
state independently to investigate and produce incriminating evidence
against those whom it has charged.
In English common law, the principles of the Crown's burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused's "right to
silence" have held steadfast. Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey explained
the importance of the Crown's evidentiary burden in Woolmington v.
Directorof Public Prosecutions:9" "[n]o matter what the charge or where
the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle
it down can be entertained. "96
In the United States, the presumption of innocence has been called
"that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' "9 This
statement appears in the Winship decision, which declared the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case a requisite of a fair
trial under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
constitution of the United States.9" Although the Court in Winship did not
mention the presumption of innocence again in its opinion, the subscription
to the importance of the presumption in this constitutional setting is

93. 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2511, at 530 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. 1935 All E.R. Reprint I (H.L.).
96. Id.at 8.
97. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
98. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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unquestionable. Some years before Winship, Chief Justice Earl Warren
had occasion to comment on the relationship of the presumption of
innocence to the privilege against self-incrimination, authoring a decision
of the Court ordering acquittal of a defendant for refusing to answer
questions before the House Un-American Activities Committee in Quinn
v. United States:"
Coequally with our other constitutional guarantees, the
Self-Incrimination Clause "must be accorded liberal construction
in favor of the right it was intended to secure." Such liberal
construction is particularly warranted in a prosecution of a
witness for a refusal to answer, since the respect normally
accorded the privilege is then buttressed by the presumption of
innocence accordeda defendant in a criminaltrial. To apply the
privilege narrowly or begrudgingly-to treat it as an historical
relic, at most merely to be tolerated-is to ignore its development
and purpose. 0 0
Given the importance of the placement of the onus of proof upon the
prosecution in the Anglo-American adversary process, and the concomitant
significance of the presumption of innocence until that burden has been
satisfied, it is curious that the American and Australian Courts have been
so quick to say that the privilege against self-incrimination should be
denied to any entity. At the very least one would expect a more reasoned
analysis than that provided in Caltex. As noted, the Caltex majority
believes even a human cannot resist a demand to produce private papers
and, therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination should not be
available to corporations either."0 ' Because the position"0 2 is based on the
reasoning of Braswell,"°3 the Braswell dissent is worth considering as it
questions that reasoning.
In Braswell, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena to Braswell as the
president of two corporations, which he operated essentially as his own
businesses-he was sole shareholder and, although his wife and mother

99. 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
100.
(1951)).
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 162 (italics added) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 504.
See id. at 497.
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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held corporate offices, neither had any authority."° Braswell claimed that
to produce the documents requested would self-incriminate. 05 The
majority, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that under the "mandate" of
the collective entity cases, "without regard to whether the subpoena is
addressed to the corporation, or as here, to the individual in his capacity
as a custodian. .

,

a corporate custodian.

. .

may not resist a subpoena

for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.""' 6 Moreover,
"[u]nder those circumstances, the custodian's act of production is not
deemed a personal act, but rather an act of the corporation. Any claim of
Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent would be tantamount to
a claim of privilege by the corporation-which of course possesses no such
privilege." 07
The majority recognized that "certain consequences flow from"' 08 a
custodian acting in a representative capacity. "Because the custodian acts
as a representative, the act is deemed one of the corporation and not the
individual. Therefore, the Government.

.

. may make no evidentiary use

of the 'individual act' against the individual."" ° Thus, in a criminal case,
the Government cannot introduce evidence that the corporation's
documents were delivered by a particular individual in response to a
subpoena. "a Rather, for example, the Government might offer evidence
by a subpoena server that the corporation produced the records
subpoenaed. In such a scenario, if an accused "held a prominent position
within the corporation that produced the records, the jury may, just as it
would had someone else produced the documents, reasonably infer that he
had possession of the documents or knowledge of their contents."'I In
this setting, since the jury is not told about the defendant's production of
the records, "any nexus between . . . [him] and the documents results

solely from the corporation's act of production and other evidence in the
case."" 2' Finally, the Court observed in a footnote:

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

110. Id.

111. Id.
112. Id.

at 100-01.
at 101.
at 108-09.
at 110.
at 117-18.
at 118.
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We leave open the question whether the agency rationale
supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate records
when the custodian is able to establish, by showing for example
that he is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, that
the jury would inevitably conclude that he produced the
records. 13

Justice Kennedy's dissent in Braswell characterized the majority
opinion as based on a "metaphysical progression" which "is flawed"' 1 4 in
arguing for recognition of the privilege in Braswell's act of production.
He asserted that "the act demanded of Braswell requires a personal
disclosure of individual knowledge, a fact which cannot be dismissed by
labeling him a mere agent."" 5 At "[tihe heart of the matter, [actually,]
as everyone knows, [is the fact that the prosecution does not see such
persons as Braswell] as mere agents at all. .

.

. What the Government

seeks instead is the right to choose any corporate agent as a target of its
subpoena and compel that individual to disclose certain information by his
own actions. "116 This, Justice Kennedy asserts, gives the corporate agency
fiction too much weight and undermines the majority's reasoning:
In a peculiar attempt to mitigate the force of its own holding, it
impinges upon its own analysis by concluding that, while the
Government may compel a named individual to produce records,
in any later proceeding against the person it cannot divulge that
he performed the act. But if that is so, it is because the Fifth
Amendment protects the person without regard to his status as a
corporate employee; and once this be admitted, the necessary
support for the majority's case has collapsed."'
Thus, the Braswell majority recognizes the validity of the claim of
privilege against self-incrimination at the same time it denies its existence.
Justice Kennedy's analysis is quite compelling and renders the
underpinnings of the Braswell principle questionable at the very least.
Finally, it is worth noting that even if the privilege against selfincrimination were deemed applicable to a corporation, the effect thereof

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

118 n.11.
126.
127.
127-28.
128.
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would be minimal. The dissenting opinion in Caltex, by Justices Deane,
Dawson, and Gaudron, asserts that the "scope of the privilege against selfincrimination in its application to corporations is, because of the very
nature of a corporation, somewhat limited. "' 18 Essentially the dissenters
made five points:
I. "A corporation cannot be a witness. " 119
2. "[T]he privilege offers no20 protection against the use of a
corporation's documents." 1
3. "[A] corporation's privilege is no ground for resisting production
of the corporation's documents by another person. .

4.

5.

.

. An

officer or an employee of a corporation cannot resist production
of documents in his possession, custody or control because their
production might incriminate the corporation."'
"Although a corporation cannot be a witness in proceedings,
when an officer or employee is called, even in criminal
proceedings against the corporation, the officer or employee may
that the answer would tend
not refuse to answer upon the basis
22
to incriminate the corporation."
"Thus, the debate about whether a corporation may claim
privilege against self-incrimination centres on the relatively
confined area of the production of documents or the answering
things which a
of interrogatories because these are the
12 3
corporation itself may be required to do."

118. Caltex, 178 C.L.R. at 535-36.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 535. The Justices note two subpoints under point 5:
Even in criminal proceedings, a notice to produce may be served on an accused
corporation, not as a means of compelling it to produce the documents sought,
but to lay the foundation for proof of their contents by secondary evidence.
And the prosecution's powers of search and seizure are an important resource
for discharging the onus which the prosecution bears. As Justice Holmes
observed in Johnson v. United States: "A party is privileged from producing
the evidence, but not from its production."
Id. (referencing Johnson, 228 U.S. 457, 468 (1913)) (citation omitted).
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77

IV. CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that the judicial and legislative tide against corporate and
"act of production" privileges can be turned back. It is equally unlikely
that the privilege against self-incrimination would receive any expansive
treatment when balanced against the interests of governments in effective
criminal investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of white collar
crime. However, the assumption that there is no basis for such privilege,
either on behalf of corporations or their agents, without more principled
analysis, is unfortunate. The effect of the abrogation of a corporation's
privilege to resist the production, on self-incrimination grounds, upon both
the adversarial system and the burden of proof in criminal adjudication is
by no means unsubstantial and is worth further analysis by the AngloAmerican Courts.

